Washington, D.C.: US President Donald Trump has approved a landmark 30-year civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, marking a significant expansion of strategic ties between Washington and Riyadh while igniting debate over its potential implications for nuclear non-proliferation and regional security in West Asia.
The agreement, negotiated under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, establishes the legal framework for American companies to participate in the development of Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy programme. The multibillion-dollar pact is expected to be formally signed by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman before undergoing mandatory review by the US Congress.
The deal is being viewed as one of the most consequential agreements between the two countries in recent years. It is expected to strengthen economic and strategic cooperation while ensuring that American firms, rather than competitors from Russia or China, play the leading role in building Saudi Arabia’s nuclear infrastructure.
A major beneficiary of the agreement is expected to be Westinghouse Electric, whose AP1000 nuclear reactor technology is considered a leading contender for deployment under the programme. The AP1000 reactor has the capacity to generate approximately 1,100 megawatts of electricity, sufficient to power a medium-sized city or support energy-intensive facilities such as artificial intelligence data centres.
Saudi Arabia has long maintained that expanding civilian nuclear power is essential to meeting the country’s growing electricity demand. The kingdom also views nuclear energy as a means to reduce its domestic reliance on crude oil for electricity generation, allowing larger volumes of oil to be exported and generating additional revenue as part of its long-term economic diversification strategy.
For the Trump administration, the agreement serves multiple strategic objectives. Besides creating opportunities for the American nuclear industry, it reinforces Washington’s partnership with Saudi Arabia while limiting the influence of Russia and China in one of the Middle East’s most ambitious civilian nuclear programmes.
One of the most closely scrutinised aspects of the agreement is its provision regarding uranium enrichment. Unlike previous US civilian nuclear agreements that generally required partner countries to permanently forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, the new accord leaves open the possibility of Saudi Arabia establishing a uranium enrichment facility under tightly controlled conditions.
According to the agreement, Washington and Riyadh will conduct a joint two-year assessment to determine whether domestic uranium enrichment is commercially viable compared to importing nuclear fuel. If the study concludes that local enrichment is economically justified, the enrichment facility could be constructed by American companies using a “black box” arrangement under which sensitive enrichment technology would remain inaccessible to Saudi Arabia.
US officials argue that this model would ensure that critical nuclear technology is not transferred while allowing strict oversight of any enrichment activities. They also maintain that spent nuclear fuel produced by Saudi reactors would not be suitable for reprocessing into weapons-grade material.
The agreement further stipulates that if the United States ultimately decides not to proceed with uranium enrichment after the joint review, Saudi Arabia would be prohibited from independently pursuing enrichment or seeking assistance from another foreign country for a period of ten years.
Despite these safeguards, the enrichment provisions have generated considerable concern among non-proliferation experts. Many analysts argue that uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing represent the principal technological pathways towards the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. They caution that even a civilian enrichment capability could provide Saudi Arabia with what is often described as a “latent” nuclear weapons capability.
The agreement also differs from earlier US nuclear cooperation arrangements in its approach to international oversight. Unlike the 2009 US-United Arab Emirates nuclear agreement, which incorporated the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol permitting more intrusive inspections, the Saudi agreement relies on a customised monitoring system combining standard IAEA safeguards with bilateral US-Saudi oversight.
Saudi Arabia reportedly declined to adopt the Additional Protocol during negotiations. While the Trump administration maintains that the agreed oversight mechanisms provide adequate monitoring of US-built facilities, critics argue that they may offer fewer tools to investigate undeclared nuclear activities beyond those installations.
Negotiations over the agreement accelerated following President Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May 2025, where discussions focused on defence cooperation, economic investment and advanced technology partnerships. The process gained further momentum during Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the White House in November 2025, when the two governments signed several agreements, including a Strategic Defence Agreement, artificial intelligence cooperation measures and a Joint Declaration on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation.
Unlike the previous Biden administration, which had linked civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi recognition of Israel as part of broader regional normalisation efforts, the Trump administration chose to separate the nuclear agreement from any requirement that Riyadh establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Although Washington continues to encourage Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, the nuclear deal proceeds independently of that objective.
The timing of the agreement has also attracted attention because it coincides with continued US efforts to pressure Iran to scale back its nuclear programme and reduce its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Some experts argue that permitting the possibility of uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia while insisting on strict limitations for Iran could create perceptions of inconsistency in US non-proliferation policy.
Administration officials reject such comparisons, asserting that Saudi Arabia’s programme would remain under continuous American oversight and would be dedicated exclusively to peaceful civilian purposes. Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained that its nuclear ambitions are intended solely for energy generation. However, observers continue to reference Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s 2018 statement that the kingdom would seek nuclear weapons if Iran were to develop one.
The agreement has triggered mixed reactions in Washington. Supporters argue that it strengthens US strategic interests, supports the domestic nuclear industry and prevents geopolitical rivals from gaining influence in the kingdom’s nuclear sector. Critics, however, warn that relaxing long-standing non-proliferation standards could encourage other countries in the region, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Egypt, to seek similar concessions.
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright defended the agreement, stating that it upholds high standards of nuclear safety and non-proliferation while showcasing advanced American nuclear technology. He also described the accord as part of a broader revival of the US nuclear industry under the Trump administration.
The agreement will now be submitted to the US Congress for review under the Atomic Energy Act. Lawmakers will have a mandatory 90-day continuous session to examine its provisions. Unless Congress passes a Joint Resolution of Disapproval, the agreement will automatically enter into force. Even if both chambers vote to block it, President Trump retains the authority to veto such a resolution, meaning opponents would require a two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to override the veto.
