Thiruvananthapuram: In a significant ruling that clarifies the ambit of anticipatory bail under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the Kerala High Court has held that the statutory bar imposed under Section 18 of the Act will not apply where the Court, on a prima facie assessment, concludes that no substantive offence attracting the Act has been made out.
The ruling came from a Single Judge Bench presided over by Justice Gopinath P., while hearing two appeals filed by accused persons under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act. The appellants had challenged the rejection of their anticipatory bail applications by a Special Judge. The Court set aside the lower court’s order and allowed anticipatory bail, while underscoring the importance of a careful prima facie evaluation before mechanically applying the bar under Section 18.
The case arose from allegations by a complainant woman, who accused the first appellant of having induced her into a relationship on the false promise of marriage and compelling her into sexual relations against her will. According to the prosecution, the complainant later began residing with the first accused in a rented house, but he subsequently reneged on his marriage promise. It was further alleged that the second accused, his brother, threatened her to discontinue her association with the first accused.
The complainant invoked provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), including rape under Section 376(2)(n) and criminal intimidation under Section 506, and also alleged offences under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
The defence, however, contested the allegations, pointing out that the complainant was already in a subsisting marriage. In such a scenario, they argued, the offence of rape on a false promise of marriage cannot be sustained. They also contended that the allegations against the second accused were doubtful, since the alleged threatening calls coincided with the period when the complainant and the first accused were living together in a healthy relationship.
Justice Gopinath P. made detailed observations on both factual and legal aspects. Referring to binding precedents, the Bench relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Hiran Das Murali v. State of Kerala, which emphasize that a consensual relationship spanning over a long period cannot ordinarily be construed as rape merely because the relationship ended in a breakup.
The Court further drew support from Anil Kumar v. State of Kerala, wherein it was held that allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage are unsustainable when one of the parties is already in a valid subsisting marriage. Applying this principle, Justice Gopinath P. concluded that the complainant’s allegation under Section 376(2)(n) IPC was prima facie untenable, since the complainant herself was married at the relevant time.
On the charge of criminal intimidation against the second accused, the Court noted that the alleged phone calls purportedly made by him coincided with the period when the complainant and the first accused were living together as husband and wife. “In such circumstances,” the Court observed, “it is at least doubtful as to whether the alleged offence under Section 506 IPC has been committed by the appellants. It is quite possible that the 1st accused was using the phone of the 2nd accused to communicate with the complainant, rather than any threat having been issued.”
A crucial part of the judgment dealt with the interplay between Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act and the statutory bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18. Section 3(2)(v) applies only where the offence alleged is punishable with a term of imprisonment for ten years or more. Justice Gopinath P. held that once the Court arrives at a prima facie conclusion that the substantive offence itself is not made out, the automatic bar under Section 18 ceases to apply.
The Bench referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, reiterated in Kiran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, to hold that anticipatory bail cannot be mechanically denied merely because the SC/ST Act has been invoked. Instead, the Court must carefully examine whether a prima facie case exists.
Justice Gopinath P. emphasized:
“…in cases where the allegation is that an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act has been committed, and when this Court prima facie concludes that the substantive offence punishable with a term of imprisonment for a period of 10 years or more has not been committed, the said prima facie conclusion is sufficient to hold that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act against the grant of anticipatory bail will not apply.”
Taking into account the factual inconsistencies, the subsisting marriage of the complainant, and the doubtful nature of the alleged threats, the High Court concluded that no prima facie case under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, Section 506 IPC, or Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was made out. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Special Judge’s order, and directed that the appellants be released on anticipatory bail, subject to conditions.
